DOU 02/10/2024 - Diário Oficial da União - Brasil

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64
Nº 191, quarta-feira, 2 de outubro de 2024
ISSN 1677-7042
Seção 1
266. Em relação às metas e objetivos do 14º Plano Quinquenal traduzidas em metas específicas em planos provinciais e/ou municipais, o Documento de Trabalho Europeu
apresenta três exemplos, relativos às províncias de Shandong, Jiangsu e Hebei, selecionadas porque representam as principais províncias onde se localizam indústrias siderúrgicas:
The 14th FYP (2021-25) on Developing Steel Industry in Shandong Province (the '14th Shandong FYP on Steel') [nota de rodapé omitida] commits the province to "strive
to build a steel industry ecology, further optimize the steel industry's layout, further adjust its structure, further consolidate its foundation and further extend its industry chain, and
deepen further the integration of the steel industry with the equipment manufacturing industry so as to double the output value of steel and its related products to trillion-scale"
[nota de rodapé omitida] during the period of the plan's validity. In that regard, the main development objectives in the 14th Shandong FYP on Steel include:
Increasing the income of main businesses by 10% annually, increasing the proportion of short-process steelmaking to about 20%, and doubling the labour productivity
of steel enterprises to 1,500 tons per person per year [nota de rodapé omitida]
Exceeding one trillion RMB in the total output value of the steel smelting, rolling, deep processing and distribution industry by 2025 (wherein high-end and high-quality
steel shall account for around 50%, high quality deep processing 25%, and the use of scrap steel as raw material 30% of the output value)[nota de rodapé omitida]. Increasing R&D
in steel products to over 3% of the business income [nota de rodapé omitida].
Creating ten enterprise tech centers at provincial-level and two to three at national level and making breakthroughs in three to five key steel materials yearly [nota de
rodapé omitida].
As regards industrial layout, the proportion of steel production capacity in the Dongjiakou port of Qingdao, the Lanshan district in Rizhao, the Lingang economic
development zone of Linyi, and other coastal areas shall be increased to more than 70%, whereas cities such as Jinan, Zibo, Liaocheng, Binzhou, Weifang and those along the Qingdao-
Jinan route shall cut their production as much as possible[nota de rodapé omitida].
Finally, the industry's overall energy and water consumption per ton of steel is to decrease below 535 kg of standard coal and 2.85 cubic meters of water, respectively:
"The total energy consumption and intensity will be reduced by more than 5%, the water consumption intensity by more than 10%, and the reuse rate of water to more than
98%."
The second example, Jiangsu Work Plan for Layout Optimization in the Transformation and Upgrading of the Steel Industry Throughout the Province (the 'Jiangsu Steel
Industry Work Plan') [nota de rodapé omitida], was released by the Government of Jiangsu in 2019. With Jiangsu being China's second biggest steel producing province, the Jiangsu
Steel Industry Work Plan was issued well before the 14th Raw Materials FYP. Therefore, the Jiangsu Steel Industry Work Plan formally does not implement the 14th Raw Materials
FYP but is rather inspired by the 19th CCP Congress (see Section 2.2.4) and President Xi's speech on the development of the Yangtze River economic belt and it implements the
Notice of General Office of Provincial Party Committee and General Office of Provincial Government on Issuing the Implementation Opinions on Accelerating the Transformation,
Upgrading and High-quality Development of Province's Chemical, Iron, Steel, Coal and Power Industry (document no 2018/32) [nota de rodapé omitida]. The Jiangsu Steel Industry
Work Plan sets several goals regarding the industrial layout, concentration and emissions.
Optimizing the ratio of steel smelting capacity along the Yangtze River and coastal areas from the existing 7:3 to 5:5 by 2025 [nota de rodapé omitida].
Enhancing agglomeration in the industry, striving to reduce the number of iron and steel enterprises in the province from 45 to about 20 while also enhancing the
production capacity of the top five enterprises to account for 70% of province's steel output by 2020 [nota de rodapé omitida].
Cutting the total emission of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and particulate matter in the province's steel industry by 30%, 50% and 50% respectively by 2020 [nota de
rodapé omitida].
Integrating the decentralized smelting enterprises in the Xuzhou region with steel production below 2 million tonnes towards the cluster of leading enterprises [nota de
rodapé omitida].
The plan further specifies that "in principle, all relocation and capacity merger and acquisition projects in the province are only allowed to be implemented in coastal
áreas' [nota de rodapé omitida].
To attain these objectives, all relevant departments in the province are required to "study and introduce more supportive policies in terms of capital, taxation, finance,
land, personnel resettlement and debt disposal"
Finally, the third example examined here is the Three-Year Action Plan for Cluster Development of Steel Industry Chain in Hebei Province ('Hebei Three-Year Action Plan')
[nota de rodapé omitida], the province with the largest steel production in China. This plan was adopted for the period 2020-2022, before the start of the 14th planning cycle, but
reflects the same objectives found in the central-level 14th FYPs. Some examples of objectives in the Hebei Three-Year Action Plan include:
Constructing a batch of demonstration blast furnaces and converters with a plant size of 3 000m³ and production capacity of 200 tonnes and above by the end of
2022.
Supporting and safeguarding downstream industry upgrading, with the share of ordinary low-alloy steel and alloy steel to reach 25% by the end of 2022.
Accelerating the process of mergers and restructuring to build a large, world-class conglomerate, with the prospect of top 10 producers reaching 65% of the total output
by the end of 2022. Efforts were also to be made to set up one or two world-class large groups, three to five powerful regional groups and eight to ten high-end niche enterprise
groups.
In the ambit of optimizing the industrial layout, three relocation projects (involving Shisteel, Laoting and Taihang) were set to have been completed and become
operational in 2020. Xuansteel's production capacity was to be closed own in 2021, and the relocation project for the urban steel plant was to be completed in all essential respects
in the course of 2022. Furthermore, the province was to focus on building the two major industrial clusters in Qian'an and Wu'an and to promote steady increases in iron and steel
production capacity along the ports and railways, focusing on the construction of four high-quality steel production bases in the ports of Caofeidian and Jingtang (Laoting County),
Fengnan Coastal Industrial Zone and Bohai New District.
When it comes to greening of steel production, by 2020, the utilisation and disposal rate of solid wastes such as steel slag, blast furnace slag and sludge was set to
reach 100%. By 2022, industrial fugitive emissions were to be greatly reduced, while energy consumption per tonne of steel was to be reduced to below 560 kg of standard coal.
Measures foreseen to ensure attaining these goals included:
preferential tax policies (e.g. for company merger and reorganisation, for industrial surplus power generation, for comprehensive utilisation of resources, as well as pre-
tax deduction of R&D costs, and export refunds),
active provision of credit support,
adjusting the land use and urban and rural planning to support the relocation, transformation and development of urban enterprises,
improving and supervising incentive mechanisms in order to promote differentiated electricity pricing, water pricing and production outage and limitation policies to
encourage enterprises to move towards green, smart, high-end production."
267. Após analisar esses exemplos, impõe-se, no entendimento da peticionária, concluir pela intervenção articulada nos diversos níveis de governo na economia (nacional,
provincial e municipal). Em outras palavras:
The above clearly shows that the goals and objectives of provincial-level planning are closely aligned with the objectives of central-level plans for the 14th FYP period even
though in the case of Jiangsu and Hebei provinces, their Work Plan and Action Plan were released already during 13th planning cycle. The plans describe in detail the velopment
objectives the steel industry should follow, most importantly in terms of capacity and layout optimization. All this evidence points to the existence of a high degree of government
intervention into the sector. The provisions of these provincial plans are an example of the extremely limited space left to the market to shape the steel sector." According to Steel
Industry Development GO, the steel industry is the key field that contributes to green and low-carbon development in general. The document identifies unfledged green and low
carbon development as one of the major challenges in the 14th FYP period. Several goals and policies are thus laid out to deepen green and low-carbon development of the steel
industry (...) (...) In an economy based on market forces, a number of these actions would be carried out by private companies. In China, instead, the authorities do not limit
themselves to setting the regulatory framework and/or promoting these actions but are the main actor in realising them.
268. A interferência do governo chinês também alcança a sucata:
The Scrap Steel FYP shows that the Chinese authorities play an active and intrusive role in the development of scrap steel resources. This could be considered as part
of their efforts to ensure green development for the steel industry.
269. Especialmente no caso do setor siderúrgico, as SOEs têm um papel muito relevante, pois nesse setor, em termos de capacidade de produção ou capacidade instalada,
cerca de 60% das empresas são SOEs e 40% privadas.
270. Ao analisar as SOEs, o Documento de Trabalho Europeu também confirma conclusão anteriormente apresentada pela autoridade investigadora brasileira a propósito
da saúde financeira, no setor siderúrgico, das SOEs em comparação com as empresas privadas:
When it comes to the performance and efficiency of the steel SOEs, according to an OECD study[nota de rodapé omitida], Chinese steel SOEs tend to exhibit poorer
financial performance compared to privately-owned enterprises ('POEs'). At the same time, Chinese SOEs received more subsidies per metric tonne compared to their private
counterparts. Amongst SOEs, larger enterprises tend to receive more subsidies compared to smaller ones. This illustrates the consolidation efforts of the Chinese authorities and
demonstrates that the Government is favouring larger SOEs in order to create world-class steel conglomerates (see Section 14.1.2). SOEs were also more likely than POEs to leverage
important subsidy amounts to create new capacity. Subsidisation therefore led to an increase of the Chinese steelmaking capacity and only aggravated the already significant
overcapacity problem.
271. Considerando, assim, o grau de intervenção governamental no setor siderúrgico associado à elevada participação das SOEs neste setor, seria possível perceber que
mesmo as empresas privadas, de fato, não operam em condições de economia de mercado.
272. Em resumo, a partir da análise empreendida pelo Documento de Trabalho Europeu, poder-se-ia concluir que o setor siderúrgico continua a ser um pilar para o governo
chinês, o que seria confirmado por diversos planos, diretivas e outros documentos focados no aço, a nível nacional, regional ou municipal.
The government guides the development of the sector in accordance with a broad range of policy tools and directives related, inter alia, to market composition and
restructuring, raw materials, investment, capacity elimination, product range, relocation, upgrading etc. Through these and other means, the government directs and controls virtually
every aspect in the development and functioning of the sector (see Section 14.1). For the last several decades Chinese policies have been to support the rise of 'national champions'
in the steel industry. To accomplish this, the Chinese authorities have employed an elaborate set of financial and other subsidies for the sector and engineered strategic mergers
that consolidated the industry players. In this respect, SOEs are a key instrument through which the government continues to develop the steel sector, not least by promoting the
creation of ever-larger steel producers. This is achieved through policies intended to shape the structure of the market, e.g. through mergers and regulation of market access. In
addition, Chinese financial institutions play a key role in implementing the government's policies in the steel sector. They provide access to finance following the government's direction
and implementing the government's policy objectives (see Section 14.3). These elements combined present a picture of a sector heavily influenced by the government. In this regard,
numerous trade defence investigations in various jurisdictions have confirmed that Chinese steel producers benefit from a wide array of State support measures and other market
distortive practices such as export restrictions affecting raw materials and inputs (see Sections 14.4 and 14.5). The overarching control of the government prevents free market forces
from prevailing in the steel sector in China. The problem of overcapacity is arguably the clearest illustration of the implications of the government's policies and the distortions
resulting therefrom. Overcapacity built up by China over years triggered a surge of low-priced Chinese exports causing a depression of steel prices globally and having a negative
impact on, inter alia, the financial situation of steel producers worldwide. While the government has committed to addressing the overcapacity problem, in particular through the
14th Raw Materials FYP and the Steel Industry Development GO, it remains to be seen whether this and other targets for the sector are successfully met, given in particular that
(i) during the 14th planning cycle, the declared objectives for the steel sector appear contradictory as far as overcapacity reduction is concerned [nota de rodapé omitida] and (ii)
following China's departure from GFSEC, it became very difficult to get any accurate information related to the reduction of overcapacity in China (see Section 14.6).
1073. Finalmente, a peticionária passou à análise do documento WT/TPR/S/415/Rev.1, da OMC, que trata do exame de políticas comerciais da China. Esse documento aduz
que não houve mudanças na legislação que trata de controle de preços:
3.3.4.2 Price controls
3.190. There were no changes to the legislation concerning price controls during the review period. Article 18 of the Price Law163 authorizes the competent authorities to carry
out, when necessary, price controls over: (i) products that have a significant bearing on the national economy and people's livelihoods; (ii) a limited number of rare products; (iii) products
of natural monopoly; (iv) key public utilities; and (v) key public services. Laws and regulations on specific industrial/service sectors may also contain provisions on price administration that
reaffirm that relevant business operators or service providers should follow the principles and rules set out by the Price Law. These laws and regulations include, inter alia, the Pharmaceutical
Administration Law, the Railway Law, the Postal Law, the Compulsory Education Law, the Notary Law, the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the
Administration of Judicial Authentication, the Civil Aviation Law, and the Commercial Bank Law. Laws and regulations related to price controls are summarized in Table 3.20. 3.191. Price
controls take two forms: "government-set prices" or "government-guided prices". Government-set prices are fixed prices set by the competent authorities, while government-guided prices
are prices set by business operators within a range of prices set by the competent pricing departments or other related government departments, within which the real price is allowed to
fluctuate. The determination of government-set prices or government-guided prices varies according to the type of product or service. Consideration is usually given to the market situation
and average social costs, as well as economic, regional, and seasonal factors, and development and social needs.

                            

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