DOU 02/12/2025 - Diário Oficial da União - Brasil

                            Documento assinado digitalmente conforme MP nº 2.200-2 de 24/08/2001,
que institui a Infraestrutura de Chaves Públicas Brasileira - ICP-Brasil.
Este documento pode ser verificado no endereço eletrônico
http://www.in.gov.br/autenticidade.html, pelo código 05152025120200017
17
Nº 229, terça-feira, 2 de dezembro de 2025
ISSN 1677-7042
Seção 1
282. Entre os documentos apresentados,
há menção a 15 medidas
governamentais relativas à indústria da borracha, com destaque para (a) Vietnam's rubber
industry master plan, em fevereiro de 1996 e (b) Rubber development planning to 2015,
with a vision to 2020, em junho de 2009 67, sendo este último um plano quinquenal
setorial, análogo àquele que observado para a cadeia automotiva.
283. Na mesma toada, a Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento
Econômico (OCDE) aponta que a borracha é um dos treze produtos agrícolas e florestais
elegíveis a medidas de fomento preferencial:
"In December 2018, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD)
issued a list of 13 key national products, which includes rice, coffee, rubber, cashews,
pepper, tea, vegetables and fruits, cassava and products thereof, pig meat, poultry meat
and eggs. The 13 products are eligible for preferential support measures, including
exemptions from or reductions in land or water surface rents; preferential credit; support
for the transfer and the application of high-technology in agriculture, human resources
training, and market development and promotion activities; and support for investments in
facilities and equipment for processing or preserving agricultural products". (grifo nosso)
284. No mesmo documento, há indicação ainda que os preços recebidos pelos
produtores de borracha natural são implicitamente taxados: "Producers of export
commodities such as natural rubber, coffee, cashew nuts and tea are implicitly taxed, in
that they receive prices for their outputs that are lower than world prices".
285. Ainda sobre o setor de borracha, cabe ressaltar que o Vietnã pode
produzir anualmente 1,3 milhão de t de látex, mas os processadores domésticos de
borracha só necessitam de cerca de 300 mil t.
286. Ademais, registra-se que a Vietnam Rubber Group (VRG) é a maior produtora
de borracha do Vietnã 70, em que o Governo do Vietnã tem participação de 96,7%.
287. Cabe também destacar que a VRG fez parceria com a Casumina em 2017
e manifestou interesse em aumentar o envolvimento na indústria de pneus:
"Specifically, Vietnam Rubber Group says its plans include expanding tyre and
tube. The company entered the tyre manufacturing business in 2017 through a partnership
with the Southern Rubber Industry Joint Stock Co. to produce the VRG brand of tyres.
Currently the company is mostly focused on growing rubber trees and processing latex,
and rubber wood, making industrial products from rubber, operating industrial parks amid
rubber plantations, and high-tech agriculture.
In the natural rubber segment, Vietnam Rubber Group manages more than
400,000 ha of rubber trees, but this business has been on a downward trend in recent
years due to low rubber prices." (grifo nosso)
288. O relatório do USDoC destaca que:
"The agriculture and agri-business sector has high levels of state ownership,
including all stages of agricultural production, with rice, coffee, and food processing
industries having particularly high levels of state ownership. The largest agriculture and
agri-food companies under the control of the Commission for the Management of State
Capital are: Vietnam Rubber Group (VRG), Vietnam National Coffee Corporation (Vinacafe),
Vietnam Northern Food Corporation (Vinafood-North), Vietnam Southern Food Corporation
(Vinafood-South), and Vietnam Forestry Corporation (Vinador). Most of these companies
have many companies under them. Many of these companies are export-oriented, and
together they pursue government objectives of revenue generation, employment, and
other economic, socioeconomic, and political goals of the GOVN.
For example, VRG has pursued the government objective of government
revenue generation and developing the industry. Concerning VRG, an article on a GOVN
news agency website states: "{a}s one of the backbones of Vietnam's agricultural industry,
rubber has been the focus of the government and related stakeholders. Like other
industries, the promotion as a national brand is meant to further push the crucial role the
industry has for the country. grifo nosso
289. Em outro trecho, o mesmo relatório ressalta que:
Many SOEs, whether equitized or not, state on their company websites that
they aim to fulfill the objectives of the government plans that are assigned to them. For
example, Vietnam Rubber Group's 2019 Annual Report states that its focus for the next
five years is 'to ensure the best fulfillment of its 2016-2020 plan that has been approved
by the Prime Minister.' Similarly, the development plans of Vietnam National Chemical
Group (Vinachem) for 2018 and 2019 mention compliance with GOVN industrial plans,
including the 2016-2020 SEDP [Socio-Economic Development Plan]. An article on
PetroVietnam's website states that its primary goal was to 'make its best efforts to over-
fulfill all targets and plans as assigned by the Government'. grifo nosso
290. Com base nos elementos apresentados, observa-se que a VRG atende
prioritariamente aos objetivos governamentais, que não necessariamente são aqueles que
tipicamente regem uma economia de mercado.
291. A PetroVietnam (PVN) seria uma empresa 100% estatal, verticalizada, que
opera não só na exploração, produção e refino de petróleo, gás, petroquímica,
fertilizantes, mas também atua na cadeia de borracha sintética. Registra-se que a borracha
sintética é utilizada para a produção de pneus de moto, sendo derivada de produtos
petroquímicos, como o eritreno e estireno (vinilbenzeno).
292. Assim, a VRG e a PVN, ambas estatais, possuem participação relevante na
fabricação de borracha natural e nos insumos para a produção de borracha sintética no
Vietnã.
293. O relatório do USDoC abordou ainda as restrições ao investimento
estrangeiro direto no setor petrolífero no Vietnã:
"Additional Sector-Specific and Commercial Activity Laws and Restrictions.
Foreign investors in Vietnam face additional hurdles due to various sector-specific and
commercial activity laws, which impose distinct regulations and restrictions tailored to
particular industries. For instance, the new Law on Credit Institutions, No. 32/2024/QH15
governs foreign investment in the banking sector by capping foreign ownership and
requiring joint ventures with local partners. The Law on Petroleum, No. 12/2022/QH15 sets
certain restrictions and requirements for foreign investment in the oil and gas industry,
including mandatory partnerships with SOEs and restrictions on certain operational
activities. While these sector-specific restrictions aim to protect national interests and
ensure local control over critical sectors, they can significantly distort competition and limit
foreign investors' operational freedom". (grifo nosso)
294. Na mesma direção, USDoC no mesmo documento menciona que:
"The list of economic activities where SOEs are required to be wholly state
owned largely overlaps with the types of economic activities in Table 4.1 above. There are,
however, some notable exceptions including 'policyoriented credit for socio-economic
development;' 'high tech activities and large investments;' and petroleum exploration,
mine development, and oil and gas exploitation. Taken together, these lists are extensive,
and it is unclear why the GOVN requires high levels of state ownership in many of the
economic activities included. For example, the justification for state monopolies in
publishing, production of scientific films and information concerning ideological and
cultural security, high-tech activities, petroleum exploration, mine development, and oil
and gas exploitation is not clearly articulated. State ownership requirements in these
industries and sectors suggest that the GOVN plans to retain strategic control over them
for the foreseeable future". (grifo nosso)
295. No caso específico de exploração de petróleo e gás natural, a Table 4.1
indicada no excerto, cita quais as atividades econômicas sujeitas a 100% de propriedade
estatal. Cabe também mencionar que o preço do petróleo e do gás são alguns dos
produtos cujos preços são determinados pelo governo. Ainda sobre a PetroVietnam, o
USDoC no mesmo documento afirma que
Many of the SOEs in these industries are tightly controlled by the GOVN and
are used by the GOVN to pursue government objectives. This is true for PetroVietnam, the
largest oil and gas company in Vietnam, which is wholly owned by the CMSC and owns
many additional SOEs.
PetroVietnam's board of directors is made up of high-ranking CPV [Communist
Party of Vietnam] members. PetroVietnam and the SOEs under it have been called upon
by the GOVN in its promulgation of Resolution No. 184-NQ/DU dated February 15, 2022,
on implementing digital transformation at all subsidiaries of PetroVietnam to 2025, with
orientations to 2030 to pursue digital transformation objectives. According to the official
GOVN news agency website, digital transformation is a 'strategic task' of PetroVietnam
and 'is expected to help the group uphold the leading role in the oil and gas industry,
contributing to successfully implementing the national digital transformation {program},
and building a digital society and digital government.' PetroVietnam and its subsidiary
companies have indeed been undertaking activities to digitize their businesses, and
PetroVietnam's gasoline production in turn was expected to exceed the level specified in
the resolution by 14 percent. (grifo nosso)
296. O relatório do USDoC também aponta distorções na formação dos preços
no mercado de gás natural. O órgão explica que existem bens e serviços sujeitos à
"valoração de preços", o que, muito embora não signifique necessariamente definição de
preços direta por parte do Estado, implica sujeição a políticas governamentais de controle
de preços diante de "flutuações anormais durante um dado período de tempo", conforme
definição da Vietnam's Law on Prices 2023 .
297. No relatório da autoridade estadunidense, há tabela de nove produtos que
podem sofrer intervenção do governo. Na referida tabela, estão listados os produtos
acabados de gás ou gasolina e o gás liquefeito de petróleo (GLP). Entre as intervenções do
governo pode-se mencionar controle da oferta e demanda, incluindo a produção, importação
ou exportação do bem ou serviço, bem como a compra e venda da reserva nacional, quando
aplicável; b) medidas de caráter financeiro ou monetário; estabelecimento de preços
específicos, tetos, pisos ou faixas de preço, com base nas características inerentes do bem ou
serviço; d) medidas de apoio de preço; e) sujeição do bem ou serviço a fundos de valoração
de preços, etc.
298. No caso da eletricidade, o USDoC aponta que há elementos que indicariam
que o controle de preços é mais frequente no Vietnã do que em outros países asiáticos:
"However, although many countries employ price controls, Vietnam has more
price controls in place than many Asian countries. Figure 5.5 below shows that Vietnam
scores below the Asia and Australasia average for price controls, indicating that they are
more pervasive in Vietnam compared to other Asian and Australasian countries".
299. Quanto aos preços praticados de eletricidade no Vietnã, o USDoC constata que:
As described above, the GOVN regulates the prices of electricity in Vietnam.
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, electricity prices in Vietnam 'remain heavily
regulated by the Vietnamese government.' The controlled electricity prices are at levels
that have caused EVN [Vietnam Eletricity], the SOE that supplies the majority of electricity
in Vietnam, to consistently lose large amounts of money. Although the GOVN has
gradually increased electricity prices in Vietnam, the price has not always kept up with
inflation. One study found that, during the period studied, which was from 2010 to 2016,
Vietnam's electricity prices actually declined in real (i.e., inflation adjusted) terms. grifo
nosso
300. Ainda no mesmo documento do USDoC:
The GOVN accounts for at least 87 percent of the electricity market. Much of
Vietnam's electricity production is accounted for by Electricity Vietnam (EVN), which is one
of the largest SEGs in Vietnam having many smaller SOEs under it and is wholly owned by
the GOVN. Fitch Ratings assesses the level of GOVN control over EVN as 'Very Strong' and
states that the GOVN appoints EVN's board of directors and senior management and
directs investments, and that EVN receives government guarantees, loans from state-
owned banks at preferential rates, project subsidies, and tax incentives. These government
supports are necessary to keep EVN afloat since the GOVN sets electricity prices in
Vietnam at levels that have caused EVN to consistently lose money. grifo nosso
301. Outro elemento de prova apresentado nos autos do processo a respeito da
presente análise diz respeito ao controle ou exercício de propriedade sobre os meios de
produção no setor de pneus de moto. A esse respeito, registra-se que a empresa Casumina,
fabricante de pneus para automóveis, caminhões, máquinas agrícolas e motocicletas,
conforme já destacado, ocupava o 61º lugar no ranking das maiores produtoras mundiais de
pneus em 2023, sendo a maior produtora no Vietnã. De acordo com MarketScreener, em
2023, o governo vietnamita controlava 51% das ações da empresa por meio de sua subsidiária
integral Vietnam National Chemical Group (Vinachem).
302. Já a empresa Danang, já mencionada e também fabricante de pneus para
automóveis, caminhões, motocicletas e bicicletas, aparecia na 65ª posição do ranking
mundial, sendo a segunda maior entre as fabricantes de pneus sediadas no Vietnã83. A
exemplo da Casumina, o Governo do Vietnã controla a empresa por meio da Vinachem,
detentora de 50% das ações da Danang.
303. Já a empresa Sao Vang Rubber Company, também produtora de pneus de
automóveis, caminhões, máquinas agrícolas e motocicletas, teria 36% de suas ações de
posse da Vinachem, enquanto a empresa Inoue Rubber Vietnam, igualmente produtora de
pneus para motocicletas e bicicletas, seria uma joint-venture entre a companhia japonesa
Inoue Rubber e a Vinachem (detentora de 24% das ações).
304. Quanto à participação de empresas estatais na economia vietnamita, o
USDoC constatou que:
"To fulfil the government objective of SOEs playing the leading role in the
economy, the GOVN created large conglomerations of SOEs that each fulfill a specific
government objective.
These SEGs [State Economic Groups] have been characterized as being the 'iron
fists of the state' and representing the 'commanding heights' of the economy. They
typically have monopoly or near-monopoly status in the industries in which they operate,
thereby inhibiting competition. Dominating entire industries allows the GOVN to target
them with industrial policies that are ostensibly intended to support an entire sector. This
allows SEGs to be granted preferential access to resources. Their monopoly positions also
allow them and their government owners to set the rules in those industries. In many
cases, SEGs and the government bodies that own them are tasked with drafting the
development plan and strategy for the entire industry. SEGs therefore do not operate on
market principles. Their size and scope of operations allows them to have significant and
widespread impact on the Vietnamese economy. There are nine SEGs in existence today in
Vietnam, which are listed in Table 4.8." (grifo nosso)
305. Em seguida, no mesmo documento o USDoC ressaltou que:
"While it is common for governments to have state ownership in certain areas
of the economy, including those providing public services, in most countries, private
enterprises dominate the manufacturing sector. For this reason, there is often a high
degree of competition in the manufacturing sector. The extent of state ownership and the
extent to which SOEs in this sector pursue government objectives is therefore particularly
important.
Although state ownership in Vietnam's manufacturing sector has declined
notably with SOE equitizations since 2010, it still has high levels of state ownership, with
446 SOEs total in this sector. Wholesale and retail trade of manufactured products also
have high levels of state ownership with 292 SOEs operating in this sector. Notably, SOEs
in the manufacturing sector make up the majority of the SOEs under the management
portfolio of the SCIC [Supervisory Board of State Capital Investment Corporation] (i.e., 75
out of the total 145 enterprises managed by the SCIC as of 2022). As noted, the SCIC is
tasked with strengthening the dominant role of the state in key sectors. The G OV N
therefore appears to view the manufacturing sector as a key industry in which it intends
to increase its control. grifo nosso
306. O estudo o USDoC abordou ainda a extensão da propriedade ou o
controle do governo sobre os meios de produção:
While GOVN statistics identify the size of the SOE sector to have declined from
40.0 percent of GDP in 2002 to a 20.6-30.2 percent range in recent years, Commerce
believes these statistics have understated SOEs' overall contributions to economic activity.
Specifically, accounting for indirect forms of SOE ownership and Vietnamese companies
with minority shares but controlled levels of government ownership would likely result in
higher estimates of state ownership. Greater transparency in the identification of SOEs'
output levels would also contribute to a more accurate, and likely higher, share of
government influence over economic activity in Vietnam.
Meanwhile, Vietnam's private sector, which accounted for almost half of GDP
according to the latest data, has not grown since 2002, in large part due to its limited
access to resources (e.g., capital). The void filled by the decline in the size of the SOE
sector is instead accounted for by foreign firms from such countries as Japan, South Korea,
and China. While the combination of these market-oriented developments has been
important, Vietnamese law still requires SOEs to play the leading role in its economy, and
benefits are still largely disproportionally bestowed upon state sector firms relative to
their private sector counterparts. As such, deeper structural reforms are needed before
the economy becomes deeply reliant upon free-forming supply and demand conditions.

                            

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